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One of the authors has recently propounded an SR (semantic
realism) model which shows, circumventing known no-go theo-
rems, that an objective (noncontextual, hence local) interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics (QM) is possible. We consider here
compound physical systems and show why the proofs of nonlo-
cality of QM do not hold within the SR model, which is slightly
simplified in this paper. We also discuss quantum measurement
theory within this model, note that the objectification problem
disappears since the measurement of any property simply reveals
its unknown value, and show that the projection postulate can be
considered as an approximate law, valid FAPP (for all practical
purposes). Finally, we provide an intuitive picture that justifies
some unusual features of the SR model and proves its consistency.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of us has recently proposed an SR model which provides an interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics (QM) that is objective.(1) Intuitively, objectivity
means here that any measurement of a physical property of an individual
sample of a given physical system reveals a preexisting value of the measured
property, that does not depend on the measurements that are carried out on
the sample.1
The SR model is inspired by a series of more general papers aiming to
supply an SR interpretation of QM that is realistic in a semantic sense, in the
framework of an epistemological position called Semantic Realism (briefly,
SR; see, e.g., Refs. 2-5): indeed, it shows how an SR interpretation can be
consistently constructed. However, the SR model is presented in Ref. 1 by
using only the standard language of QM, in order to make it understandable
even to physicists that are not interested in the conceptual subtelties of the
general theory. But the treatment in Ref. 1 does not deal explicitly with the
special case of compound physical systems, hence neither the measurement
problem nor the locality/nonlocality problem are considered, even though the
locality of the interpretation of QM provided by the SR model is anticipated.
Therefore, we intend to discuss briefly these topics in the present paper.
Our analysis begins with some preliminaries. We discuss in Sec. 2 the
concept of physical property from a logical viewpoint, stress that properties
1More rigorously, objectivity can be intended as a purely semantic notion, as follows.
Any physical theory is stated by means of a general language which contains a theoretical
language LT and an observative language LO. The former constitutes the formal apparatus
of the theory and contains terms denoting theoretical entities (as probability amplitudes,
electromagnetic fields, etc.). The latter is linked to LT by means of correspondence rules
that provide an indirect and partial interpretation of LT on LO. Furthermore, LO is
interpreted by means of assignment rules which make some symbols of LO correspond
to macroscopic entities (as preparing and measuring devices, outcomes, etc.), so that the
elementary sentences of LO are verifiable, or testable, since they state verifiable properties
of individual objects of the kind considered by the theory (note that this does not imply
that also the molecular sentences of LO are testable). On the basis of these assigments, a
truth theory is (often implicitly) adopted that defines truth values for some or all sentences
of LO. Then, we say that physical properties are objective in the given theory if the
truth values of all elementary sentences of LO are defined independently of the actual
determination of them that may be done by an observer (for instance, the correspondence
theory of truth reaches this goal by means of a set-theoretical model; by the way, we note
that this truth theory entails only a form of observative, or macroscopic, realism, even if
it is compatible with more demanding forms of realism).
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having different logical orders correspond to different kinds of experimental
procedures, and note that the properties represented by projection operators
in standard QM or in the SR model are first order properties only; we also
point out that, even if every state S of the physical system can be associated
with a first order property (the support FS of S), recognizing an unknown
state requires experimental procedures corresponding to higher order prop-
erties, which is relevant to the treatment of the measurement problem, as we
show in Sec. 6. Furthermore, we briefly analyze in Sec. 3 some typical proofs
of nonlocality of standard QM and individuate in them a common general
scheme, notwithstanding their differences.
Bearing in mind the above preliminaries, we deal with the locality prob-
lem from the viewpoint of the SR model in Sec. 4. We provide firstly a
slightly simplified version of the model, and then note that the objective in-
terpretation of QM provided by it supplies an intuitive local picture of the
physical world and avoids a number of paradoxes, since objectivity implies
locality. But this entails that the arguments examined in Sec. 3 must fail
to hold, otherwise one would get a contradiction. Thus, we dedicate the
rest of Sec. 4 to show that the proofs of nonlocality in Sec. 3 are actually
invalid within the SR model, so that no inconsistency occurs. As a byprod-
uct of our analysis, we get that Bell’s inequalities do not provide a test for
distinguishing local realistic theories from QM.
We then come to quantum measurements and observe in Sec. 5 that the
SR model avoids the main problem of standard quantum measurement the-
ory, i.e., the objectification problem; we also note that measurements still
play a nonclassical role according to the SR model, since choosing a specific
measurement establishes which properties can be known and which remain
unknown, but point out some relevant differences between this perspective
and the standard QM viewpoint. Moreover, we show in Sec. 6 that the fur-
ther problem of double (unitary/stochastic) evolution of quantum measure-
ment theory disappears within the SR model, since stochastic evolution can
be considered as an approximate law that is valid for all practical purposes ;
we also discuss some consequences of the projection postulate that illustrate
further the differences existing between the interpretation of the measuring
process according to the SR model and the standard interpretation.
Finally, we provide in Sec. 7 an intuitive picture that justifies some
relevant features of the SR model and proves its consistency by modifying
the extended SR model (1) in which microscopic properties are introduced as
theoretical entities.
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2. PHYSICAL PROPERTIES, STATES AND SUPPORTS
Consider the following sets of statements in the standard language of physics.
(i) “The energy of the system falls in the interval [a,b]”.
“The system has energy E and momentum ~p at time t”.
(ii) “The energy of the system falls in the interval [a,b] with frequency f
whenever the system is in the state S”.
“If the system has energy E , then its momentum is ~p with frequency f ”.
(iii) “The energy of the system falls in the interval [a,b] with a frequency
that is maximal in the state S”.
“If the system has energy E , then its momentum is ~p with a frequency
that is maximal whenever the system is in the state S”.
All these statements express, in some sense, “physical properties” of a
physical system. But these properties have not the same logical status, cor-
respond to conceptually different experimental apparatuses, and a careful
analysis of their differences is useful if one wants to discuss the objective
interpretation of QM provided by the SR model in the case of compound
physical systems. Therefore, let us preliminarily observe that the word sys-
tem in the above statements actually means individual sample of a given
physical system, or physical object according to the terminology introduced
in the SR model (indeed the term physical system is commonly used in the
standard language of physics for denoting both classes of physical objects
and individual samples, leaving to the context the charge of making clear the
specific meaning that is adopted). Then, let us note that the first statement
in (i) assigns the property
F=having energy that falls in the interval [a,b]
to a physical object, while the second statement assigns the properties
E=having energy E at time t,
P=having momentum ~p at time t.
The properties F, E, P are first order properties from a logical viewpoint,
since they apply to individual samples, and each of them can be tested (in a
given laboratory) by means of a single measurement performed by a suitable
ideal dichotomic registering device having outcomes 0 and 1 (of course, E
and P can be tested conjointly only if they are commeasurable).
Let us come to the statements in (ii). These assign second order proper-
ties to ensembles of physical objects. To be precise, in the first statement
one considers the ensemble of objects that possess the property F and the
ensemble of objects that are in the state S, and the second order property
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regards the number of objects in their intersection, which must be such that
its ratio with the number of the objects in S is f. Analogously, in the second
statement one considers the ensemble of objects that possess the property E
and the ensemble of objects that possess the property P, and the second order
property regards the number of objects in their intersection, which must by
such that its ratio with the number of objects that possess the property E is
f. The first of these properties can be tested by producing a given number of
physical objects in the state S, performing measurements of the first order
property F on its elements, counting the objects that have the property F,
and then calculating a relative frequency. The second property can be tested
by means of analogous procedures (which require measurements of first order
properties on a number of objects) if E and P are commeasurable, while there
is no procedure testing it in standard QM if E and P are not commeasurable.
Finally, the statements in (iii) assign third order properties to sets of
ensembles. The property in the first statement can be tested (in a given
laboratory) by producing sets of ensembles, performing measurements of first
order properties on all elements of each ensemble, calculating frequencies, and
finally comparing the obtained results. The property in the second statement
requires analogous procedures, which may exist or not, depending on the
commeasurability of E and P.
It is now apparent that one could take into account further statements
containing properties of still higher order. Our discussion however is suf-
ficient to prove the main point here: properties of different logical orders
appear in the common language of physics, and properties that are different
when looked at from this logical viewpoint are also different from a phys-
ical viewpoint. Of course, nothing prohibits that a first order property F
be attributed to some or all elements of an ensemble of physical objects:
but first order properties must be distinguished from higher order proper-
ties, and, in particular, from correlation properties, which usually are second
order properties that establish relations among first order properties (the ex-
ample above shows that the measurement of a property of this kind requires
the comparison of sets of results obtained by measuring first order proper-
ties). We shall see that this distinction is relevant when dealing with the
measurement problem in Sec. 6.
From a mathematical viewpoint, only first order properties are repre-
sented directly within standard QM. To be precise, let (L(H),≤) be the
lattice of all orthogonal projection operators on the Hilbert space H of a
physical system, and let L be the set of all first order properties of the
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system. According to standard QM, every element of (L(H),≤) represents
bijectively (in absence of superselection rules) an element of L. For the sake
of brevity, we call any element of L physical property, or simply property, in
the following, omitting the reference to the logical order.
The set L can be endowed with the partial order induced on it by the
mathematical order ≤ defined on L(H) (that we still denote by ≤), and the
lattice (L,≤) is usually called the lattice of properties of the system. It follows
that every pure state S can be associated with a minimal property FS ∈ L
that is often called the support of S in the literature (see, e.g., Ref. 6). To
be precise, if S is represented in H by the vector | ϕ〉, FS is the property
represented by the one-dimensional projection operator Pϕ = | ϕ〉〈ϕ |, which
obviously is such that Pϕ ≤ P for every P ∈ L(H) such that ||P| ϕ〉 ||2=
1. It is then apparent that FS can be characterized as the property that is
possessed by a physical object x with certainty (i.e., with probability 1) iff x
is in the state S. Indeed, for every vector | ϕ′〉 representing a pure state S′,
one gets ||Pϕ | ϕ′〉 ||2= 1 iff | ϕ′〉 = eiθ | ϕ〉, hence iff S′ = S.
The existence of a support for every pure state of a physical system is
linked with the problem of distinguishing different pure states, or pure states
from mixtures, in standard QM. Indeed, there is no way in this theory for
recognizing experimentally the state S of a single physical object x whenever
this state is not known (for the sake of brevity, we assume here that S is
a pure state): even if one measures on x an observable A that has S as an
eigenstate corresponding to a nondegenerate eigenvalue a, and gets just a
(equivalently, if one tests the support FS of S and gets that FS is possessed
by x), one cannot assert that the state of x was S before the measurement,
since there are many states that could yield outcome a and yet are different
from S (for instance, all pure states that are represented by vectors that are
not orthogonal to the vector representing S). But if one accepts the definition
of states as equivalence classes of preparing devices propounded by Ludwig
(and incorporated within the SR model(1)) one can know whether a given
preparing device π prepares physical objects in the state S (briefly, one can
recognize S) by measuring mean values of suitable observables, which is ob-
viously equivalent to testing second order properties. The simplest way of
doing that is testing FS on a huge ensemble of objects prepared by π by
means of an ideal dichotomic device r : indeed, one can reasonably assume
that π belongs to the state S whenever r yields outcome 1 on all samples,
that is, whenever FS is possessed by every physical object x prepared by π
or, equivalently, the mean value of FS is 1. In particular, if S is an entangled
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state of a compound physical system made up by two subsystems, this pro-
cedure allows one to distinguish S from a mixture MS corresponding to S via
biorthogonal decomposition (see, e.g., Ref. 7). Also this remark is relevant
to the quantum theory of measurement (see Sec. 6).
3. NONLOCALITY WITHIN STANDARD QM
The issue of nonlocality of QM was started by a famous paper by Einstein,
Podolski and Rosen (EPR),(8) which however had different goals: indeed,
it aimed to show that some reasonable assumptions, among which locality,
imply that standard QM is not complete (in a very specific sense introduced
by the authors), hence it can not be considered as a final theory of microworld.
Later on, the thought experiment proposed by EPR, regarding two physical
systems that have interacted in the past, was reformulated by Bohm(9) and
a number of further thought experiments inspired by it were suggested and
used in order to point out the conflict between standard QM and locality.
Hence, one briefly says that standard QM is a nonlocal theory.
As anticipated in Sec. 1, we want to schematize some typical proofs of
nonlocality in this section, in order to prepare the ground to our criticism in
Sec. 4. For the sake of clearness, we proceed by steps.
(1) The existing proofs of nonlocality of QM can be grouped in two classes
(see, e.g., Ref 10). (i)The proofs showing that deterministic local theories are
inconsistent with QM. (ii)The more general proofs showing that stochastic
local theories (which include deterministic local theories) are inconsistent
with QM. For the sake of brevity, we will only consider the proofs in (i). It is
indeed rather easy to extend our analysis and criticism to the proofs in (ii).
(2) We denote by QPL in the following a set of empirical quantum laws,
which may be void (intuitively, a physical law is empirical if it can be directly
checked, at least in principle, by means of suitable experiments, such as, for
instance, the relations among compatible observables mentioned in the KS
condition;(1) a more precise distinction between empirical and theoretical laws
will be introduced in Sec. 4, (2)). We denote by LOC the assumption that
QM is a local theory (in the standard EPR sense,2 that can be rephrased by
2“Since at the time of measurement the two systems no longer interact, no real change
can take place in the second system in consequence of anything that can be done to the
first system”.(8)
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saying that a measurement on one of many spatially separated subsystems
of a compound physical system does not affect the properties of the other
subsystems). Finally, we denote by R the following assumption.
R. The values of all physical properties of any physical object are prede-
termined for any measurement context.
(3) Bearing in mind the definitions in (2), the general scheme of a typical
proof of nonlocality is the following.
Firstly, one proves that
QPL and LOC and R ⇒ (not QM),
or, equivalently,
QM ⇒ (not QPL) or (not LOC) or (not R).
Secondly, since QM ⇒ QPL, one gets
QM ⇒ (not LOC) or (not R).
Finally, one proves that
QM and (not R) ⇒ (not LOC),
so that one concludes
QM ⇒ (not LOC).
(4) Let us consider some proofs of nonlocality and show that they actually
follow the scheme in (3).
Bell’s original proof.(11) Here, the Bohm variant of the EPR thought ex-
periment is considered (which refers to a compound system made up by a
pair of spin-1/2 particles formed somehow in the singlet spin state and mov-
ing freely in opposite directions). Then, a Bell’s inequality concerning some
expectation values (hence a physical law linking second order properties, see
Sec. 2) is deduced by using assumptions LOC and R together with a perfect
correlation law (PC: if the measurement on one of the particles gives the re-
sult spin up along the u direction, then a measurement on the other particle
gives the result spin down along the same direction), which is an empirical
law linking first order properties and following from the general theoretical
laws of QM. The deduction is based on the fact that assumption R allows one
to introduce hidden variables specifying the state of a physical system in a
more complete way with respect to the quantum mechanical state. Then, the
expectation values predicted by QM are substituted in the Bell’s inequality
and found to violate it.
The above procedure can be summarized by the implication PC and LOC
and R⇒ (not QM), which matches the first step in the general scheme, with
PC representing QPL in this particular case. One thus obtains QM ⇒ (not
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LOC) or (not R) and concludes that QM contradicts local realism. The last
step in the scheme was not done explicitly by Bell and can be carried out
by adopting, for instance, the proof that PC and LOC ⇒ R (hence PC and
(not R) ⇒ (not LOC)) propounded by Redhead.(12)
We add that the same paradigm, with PC as a special case of QPL, occurs
in different proofs, as Wigner’s(13) and Sakurai’s.(14) In these proofs, however,
an inequality is deduced (still briefly called Bell’s inequality) that concerns
probabilities rather than expectation values.
Clauser et al.’s proof.(15) This proof introduces a generalized Bell’s in-
equality, sometimes called BCHSH’s inequality, that concerns expectation
values (hence it expresses a physical law linking second order properties, as
Bell’s inequality). This inequality is compared with the predictions of QM,
finding contradictions. BCHSH’s inequality is deduced by using LOC and R
only, so that one proves that LOC and R⇒ (not QM), hence QPL is void in
this case. The rest of the proof can be carried out as in the general scheme.
Greenberger et al.’s proof.(16) Here no inequality is introduced. A system
of four correlated spin-1/2 particles is considered, and the authors use di-
rectly a perfect correlation law PC1 (that generalizes the PC law mentioned
above), R and LOC3 in order to obtain a contradiction with another perfect
correlation law PC2, hence with QM. Thus, the authors prove that PC1 and
LOC and R⇒ (not QM), which matches the first step in the general scheme,
with PC1 representing QPL in this case. Again, the rest of the proof can be
carried out as in the general scheme.
Mermin’s proof.(17) Also this proof does not introduce inequalities. The
author takes into account a system of three different spin-1/2 particles, as-
sumes a quantum physical law linking first order properties (the product of
four suitably chosen dichotomic nonlocal observables is equal to -1) together
with LOC and (implicitly) R, and shows that this law cannot be fulfilled to-
gether with other similar laws following from QM. Thus, also Mermin proves
an implication of the form QPL and LOC and R ⇒ (not QM), from which
the argument against LOC can be carried out as in the general scheme.
(5) The analysis in (4) shows that the scheme in (3) provides the general
structure of the existing proofs of nonlocality. In this scheme, assumptions
R and LOC play a crucial role. Let us therefore close our discussion by
3To be precise, the authors introduce, besides LOC, realism and completeness in the
EPR sense. These assumptions are however equivalent, as far as the proof is concerned,
to assumption R.
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comparing R and LOC with the assumption of objectivity (briefly, O), which
plays instead a crucial role in the proofs of contextuality of standard QM.(5)
Let us note firstly that assumption R expresses a minimal form of realism.
This realism can be meant in a purely semantic sense, as objectivity (see
Sec. 1), hence it is compatible with various forms of ontological realism
(as the assumption about the existence of elements of reality in the EPR
argument4) but does not imply them.(4) Yet, R is weaker than O. Indeed, O
entails that the values of physical properties are independent of the measuring
apparatuses (noncontextuality), while R may hold also in a contextual theory
(as Bohm’s), since it requires only that the values of physical properties are
not brought into being by the very act of measuring them.5
Let us note then that O also implies LOC, since it entails in particular
that the properties of the subsystems of a compound physical system exist
independently of any measurement. By putting this implication together
with the implication O ⇒ R, one gets O ⇒ LOC and R. However, the
converse implication does not hold, since R and LOC are compatible with
the existence of measurements that do not influence each other at a distance
but influence locally the values of the properties that are measured. Thus,
we conclude that R and LOC are globally weaker than O.
4. RECOVERING LOCALITY WITHIN THE SR MODEL
It is well known that nonlocality of standard QM raises a number of problems
and paradoxes. However, it has been proven in several papers (see, e.g., Refs.
4 and 18-20) that the general SR interpretation of QM invalidates some
typical proofs of nonlocality. Basing on our analysis in Sec. 3, we want to
attain in this section a similar result within the framework of the SR model,
which has the substantial advantage of avoiding a number of logical and
epistemological notions, making things clear within the standard language
of QM. To this end, we use throughout in the following the definitions and
concepts introduced in Ref. 1.
4“If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with
probability equal to 1) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of
physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity”.(8)
5In order to avoid misunderstandings, we note explicitly that assumption R coincides
with assumption R in Ref. 4 and not with assumption R in Ref. 5, which is instead the
assumption of objectivity.
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It is important to observe that we are led to question the proofs of non-
locality not only for general theoretical reasons (in particular, attaining a
more intuitive local picture of the physical world) but also to avoid incon-
sistencies. Indeed, as we have anticipated in Sec. 1, the proofs in Sec. 3
raise a consistency problem. For, should they be valid within the SR model,
QM would be a nonlocal theory also according to this model: but, then, the
model could not provide an objective interpretation of QM, since objectivity
entails both R and LOC (see (5) in Sec. 3).
For the sake of clearness, we again proceed by steps.
(1) Let us summarize some features of the SR model and introduce in it
some simplifications that make it more intuitive and easy to handle.
Firstly, the main feature of the model is the substitution of every phys-
ical observable A of standard QM with an observable A0 in which a no-
registration outcome a0 is added to the spectrum of A. This is an old idea.
Yet, a0 is interpreted in the model as a possible result of a measurement of
A0 providing information about the physical object that is measured, which
introduces a new perspective, since the occurrence of a0 is usually attributed
to a lack of efficiency of the measuring apparatus. The family of properties
associated with an observable A0 is then EA0 = {(A0,∆)}∆∈B(R)) (where B(R)
denotes the σ-ring of all Borel sets on the real line R).
Secondly, states are defined as in standard QM, and all properties are
assumed to be objective, hence the information about a physical object x
following from the knowledge of its state is incomplete. Thus, there is a set of
properties that are possessed by all objects in the state S (the set of properties
that are certainly true in S, see Sec. 5), but different objects in S may
differ because of further properties. One can then focus on some additional
properties, take them (together with S) as initial, or boundary, conditions,
and consider the subset of all objects in S that possess them. Different choices
of the additional properties lead to different subsets (which may intersect).
We briefly say that one can consider different physical situations. It is then
apparent that these situations can be partitioned in two basically different
classes. Indeed, one can choose as additional properties the property of
being detected and some further properties (possibly none) that are pairwise
commeasurable (i.e., simultaneously measurable, see Ref. 1): in this case an
accessible physical situation is considered. On the contrary, if one chooses
the property of being not detected or some further properties that are not
pairwise commeasurable, a nonaccessible physical situation is considered.
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Thirdly, the following nonclassical Metatheoretical Generalized Principle
holds within the SR model (the same principle was stated in a number of
previous papers, basing on general arguments, see, e.g., Refs. 3 and 5).
MGP. A physical statement expressing an empirical physical law is true when-
ever an accessible physical situation is considered, but it may be false (as well
as true) whenever a nonaccessible physical situation is considered.
Finally, properties are represented by projection operators, as in standard
QM, but the representation is not one-to-one, since the property (A0,∆), with
a0 /∈ ∆, and the property (A0,∆∪{a0}) are represented by the same operator.
This feature, however, makes the SR model unnecessarily complicate, since
the representation of any property (A0,∆), with a0 ∈ ∆, is not needed in
the following (nor to reach the conclusions in Ref. 1). Thus, we modify
it here by simply assuming that projection operators represent bijectively
(up to a physical equivalence relation, see Ref. 1) all properties of the form
(A0,∆), with a0 /∈ ∆, while all remaining properties, though entering physical
reasonings, have no mathematical representation. Then, we assume that the
probability of a given property of the form (A0,∆), with a0 /∈ ∆, for a physical
object in a given state can be evaluated, in every accessible physical situation,
by referring to the representation of states and properties and using the rules
of standard QM (the name SR model will refer to this simplified version of the
model from now on). It follows in particular that all quantum laws expressed
by the standard mathematical language of QM link only properties such that
a0 /∈ ∆, which becomes intuitively clear within the picture provided at the
end (see Sec. 7).
(2) MGP is an epistemological principle regarding the range of validity of
physical laws, and it implies a change in our way of looking at the laws of QM,
not a change in the laws themselves. Moreover, it provides the main argument
against the standard proofs of nonlocality, that are thus criticized from an
epistemological rather than from a technical viewpoint. MGP plays therefore
a crucial role within the SR model, and it may be useful to reconsider here
some arguments that suggest introducing it.
Let us begin by making clear the distinction between empirical and the-
oretical physical laws that is presupposed by MGP. In any theory, hence in
QM, a law is said to be empirical if it is obtained from theoretical laws of
the formal apparatus of the theory via correspondence rules and is expressed
by a testable sentence of the observative language of the theory (see foot-
note 1), so that it may undergo a process of empirical control (theoretical
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laws can then be seen as schemes of laws, from which empirical laws can be
deduced(21)). This definition, however, does not mean that an empirical law
can always be checked. Let us consider, for example, an empirical law in
which only pairwise commeasurable first order properties appear. If x is a
physical object (in a state S) that is detected and, furthermore, additional
properties are chosen that are pairwise commeasurable, and these properties
are pairwise commeasurable with all properties appearing in the law, then
an accessible physical situation is considered (see (1)), and one can check
both whether x actually has all the hypothesized properties and whether the
law holds. On the contrary, whenever x is not detected, or it is detected
but additional properties are chosen that are not pairwise commeasurable
with the properties appearing in the law, a nonaccessible physical situation
is considered, and it is impossible either to make a check (if x is not detected)
or to check both whether x has the hypothesized properties and whether the
law holds (if x is detected).
The above example shows that one can consider physical situations in
which an empirical physical law cannot, in principle, be checked. It is then
consistent with the operational philosophy of QM to assume that the validity
of an empirical law can be asserted only in accessible physical situations,
which directly leads to MGP.
Finally, we note that, whenever an empirical law linking physical prop-
erties is expressed by means of the standard mathematical language of QM,
then only objects that are actually detected are automatically considered, be-
cause of the simplification of the model introduced in (1). Also in this case,
however, nonaccessible physical situations can occur whenever properties ap-
pear in the initial conditions (see (1)) that are represented by projection
operators which do not commute with the projection operators representing
the properties that appear in the law.
(3) Let us come now to our criticism of the standard proofs of nonlocality.
Because of our analysis in Sec. 3, (4), this criticism can be carried out by
referring to the scheme in Sec. 3, (3). Let us firstly show that the standard
proofs of nonlocality are doubtful even if the SR model is ignored. To this
end, note that also assumption R, though weaker than objectivity, implies
that nonaccessible physical situations can be considered. Indeed, it follows
from R that a value is defined for every property of a physical object x and
for every measurement context, so that it is sufficient to choose a set of non-
commeasurable properties for considering a situation of this kind. Moreover,
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direct inspection shows that the scheme in Sec. 3, (3) is not exhaustive.
Indeed, all proofs of nonlocality considered in Sec. 3, (4) use, besides the
explicit assumptions stated in the scheme, the implicit assumption that all
empirical quantum laws can be applied to physical objects in every physical
situation, be it accessible or not. This assumption is problematic if viewed at
from a standard operational quantum viewpoint, since it introduces within
QM a classical conception of empirical physical laws (we therefore call it
Metatheoretical Classical Principle or briefly MCP,(3) in the following6).
Let us come, however, to the SR model. Within this model, objectivity
implies that accessible and nonaccessible physical situations must be intro-
duced, and MCP can be proven to break down by means of an example,
while the weaker MGP holds.(1) Thus, the proofs in Sec. 3, (4) are invalid
and the consistency problem pointed out at the beginning of this section is
avoided.
To complete our argument, it remains to point out where exactly each of
the aforesaid proofs uses MCP. Let us discuss this issue in some details.
(4) Firstly, let us consider Bell’s,(11) Wigner’s(13) and Sakurai’s(14) proofs.
Here, it is immediate to see that the PC law is applied repeatedly to physical
objects that are hypothesized to possess spin up along non-parallel direc-
tions. Hence, this law is directly applied in nonaccessible physical situations,
implicitly adopting MCP and violating MGP.
Secondly, let us consider Clauser’s et al.’s(15) proof. This proof deserves
special attention, since no physical law linking first order properties is used
in it. Therefore, let us observe that the BCHSH inequality contains a sum of
expectation values in which noncompatible observables occur. Hence, every
expectation value must be evaluated making reference to different sets of
physical objects: all objects are prepared in the same entangled state (to
be precise, the singlet state), but in each set only commeasurable physical
properties are measured, which differ from set to set. The same procedure
is needed if the quantum inequality corresponding to the BCHSH inequality
is considered. Yet, according to the SR model, the expectation values in the
BCHSH inequality are evaluated taking into account all physical objects in
each set. On the contrary, the quantum rules provide probabilities referring
6Note that MCP implies assuming the KS condition stated by Kochen and Specker “for
the successful introduction of hidden variables” in their proof of contextuality of QM,(22)
and then adopted in all successive proofs of contextuality. Hence, our present criticism
generalizes the criticism to the KS condition carried out in Ref. 1.
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to accessible situations only,(1) hence the expectation values in the quantum
inequality take into account only the subsets of objects that are actually
detected in each set. These subsets are selected by apparatuses that differ
from set to set, and could be unfair statistical samples of the whole set to
which they belong, since in each set the measurements select, because of
the no-registration outcome that can occur,(1) a subset of physical objects in
which the statistical relations among the measured properties can be different
from the relations that hold in the original set and from the relations that
hold in the other sets. Thus, the BCHSH and the quantum inequality cannot
be identified, and no contradiction with QM occurs.
Note that we have avoided using MGP in the above argument since MGP
has not been justified explicitly in the case of empirical laws linking second
order properties (see (2); it is interesting to observe that the argument can
then be used in order to justify MGP in this case). But if one accepts MGP,
one can simply say that the quantum predictions on probabilities can be
invalid, because of MGP, if also physical objects in nonaccessible physical
situations are considered, as in the BCHSH inequality: hence, identifying
this inequality with the corresponding quantum inequality violates MGP.
Thirdly, let us consider Greenberger et al.’s(16) proof. Here, different
perfect correlation laws PC1 and PC2 are applied to the same physical object,
and the properties in PC1 are not all commeasurable with the properties in
PC2. Hence a nonaccessible physical situation is envisaged in which PC1 and
PC2 are assumed to be valid, implicitly adopting MCP and violating MGP.
Finally, let us consider Mermin’s(17) proof. Here, different quantum laws
are applied to a given physical object, and there are observables in some of
the laws that are not compatible (in the standard sense of QM) with some
observables in the other laws. From the viewpoint of the SR model, this
produces a nonaccessible physical situation in which some empirical physical
laws are assumed to be valid, implicitly adopting MCP and violating MGP.
(5) Coming back to the scheme in Sec. 3, (3), our arguments in (3) and
(4) above can be summarized by saying that the implication QPL and LOC
and R⇒ (not QM) must be substituted by QPL and LOC and R and MCP
⇒ (not QM), which does not hold within the SR model (and is criticizable
even within standard QM, see (3)), so that (not LOC) does not follow from
QM.
We note explicitly that one can still object that our arguments in (3)
are not conclusive. Indeed, objectivity does not imply only R and LOC,
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as pointed out in Sec. 3, (5), but also the weaker assumptions that are
introduced when considering local stochastic theories (as the factorization of
probabilities in objective local theories, see, e.g., Ref. 10), so that one should
still show that the proofs that these theories are inconsistent with QM are
invalid within the SR model. As we have anticipated in Sec. 3, (1), however,
it is easy to extend our arguments in (3) in order to attain this invalidation.
(6) The result obtained in (3) raises, in particular, the problem of the role
of Bell’s inequalities. Indeed, these inequalities are usually maintained to pro-
vide crucial tests for discriminating between local realism and QM (see, e.g.,
Refs. 7 and 23). One may then wonder about what would happen, according
to the SR model, if one should perform a test of a Bell’s inequality: would
it be violated or not? The answer is that there are basically two kinds of
Bell’s inequalities, as our analysis in Sec. 3, (4) shows. Those obtained from
assumptions LOC and R only, as BCHSH’s inequality, are correct theoretical
formulas which are not epistemically accessible, hence cannot be tested (see
also Refs. 4 and 24, where however the original Bell’s inequality was not
classified properly). Any physical experiment tests something else (correla-
tions among commeasurable properties of physical objects that are actually
detected), hence yields the results predicted by QM. No contradiction occurs,
since the inequalities that can be tested in QM could be identified with Bell’s
inequalities only violating MGP. Thus, the latter inequalities do not provide
methods for testing experimentally whether either QM or local realism is
correct, according to the SR model. But the difference between quantum
inequalities and Bell’s inequalities proves that some quantum laws regarding
compound systems fail to hold in nonaccessible physical situations.
The above arguments do not apply to the inequalities that are deduced
by using repeatedly a non void set QPL of empirical quantum laws besides R
and LOC. These inequalities are simply incorrect according to the SR model,
since they are deduced by applying QPL in nonaccessible physical situations.
5. OBJECTIVITY AND MEASUREMENT
The objective interpretation of QM provided by the SR model avoids from the
very beginning the main problem of the quantum theory of measurement, i.e.
the objectification problem. Indeed, it allows one to interpret a measurement
of a property F on a physical object x as an inquiry about whether F is
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possessed or not by x, not as an objectification of F. Generally speaking, this
brings back the measurement problem to classical terms.
It must be stressed, however, that some typical quantum features do
not disappear in the SR model. In particular, the existence of a non-trivial
commeasurability relation prohibits one from testing all properties possessed
by a given physical object x conjointly, so that the knowledge of all properties
of x in a given state cannot be provided by any measurement. It is thus
interesting to inquire further into the knowledge of properties that one attains
when the state of x is specified. Therefore, let us suppose that x is in the
(pure) state S represented by the vector | ϕ〉.7 It is easy to see that in the
SR model (as in standard QM) a subset ES exists, made up by properties
that are certainly true in S (that is, have probability 1 in S). To be precise,
ES contains all properties of the form (A0,∆) such that:
(i) A0 is a physical observable obtained from an observable A of standard
QM by adding a no-registration outcome a0, see Sec. 4, (1);
(ii) ∆ is a Borel set on the real line R that includes a0;
(iii) (A0,∆\ {a0}) is represented by a projection operator P on the Hilbert
space H of the system such that P| ϕ〉 = | ϕ〉.
Indeed, if A0 is measured, one either gets outcome a0 (x is not registered) or
an outcome that belongs to ∆\ {a0}, since standard quantum rules hold for
evaluating the probability of (A0,∆\ {a0}) in the state S (see Sec. 4, (1)),
and ‖P| ϕ〉‖2 = 1 because of (iii). Analogously, one sees that a subset E⊥S
made up by properties that are certainly false in S (that is, have probability
0 in S) exists. To be precise, E⊥S contains all properties of the form (A0,∆)
such that A0 is defined as in (i), ∆ is a Borel set on the real line that does
not include a0, and (A0,∆) is represented by a projection operator P such
that P| ϕ〉 = 0. Thus, one obtains that the specification of the state S of x
provides information about the properties in the set ES ∪ E⊥S .
The set ES∪E⊥S , however, is strictly contained in the set E of all properties,
each of which is objective according to the SR model. It is indeed easy to see
that there are properties in E\(ES ∪ E⊥S ) such that one cannot deduce from
knowing S whether they are possessed or not by x. Hence, the information
provided by S is incomplete within the SR model (see Sec. 4, (1)). This has
7Because of the projection postulate, in standard QM one can obtain physical objects
in the state S by choosing an observable A that has S as eigenstate belonging to a nonde-
generate eigenvalue a, performing ideal measurements of A and selecting the objects that
yield the outcome a. This procedure (with A0 in place of A) is still valid within the SR
model (see Sec. 6, Eq. (1)).
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many relevant consequences. Let us point out here some of them.
Firstly, some pairwise commeasurable properties in E\(ES ∪ E⊥S ) can be
tested, so that for each of them one can say whether it was possessed or
not by x (in the state S) before the measurement, increasing our information
on x without introducing contradictions. This possibility does not occur in
standard QM, where a property that has not probability 1 or 0 is not real
in S, and a test actualizes it, so that one can say that it is possessed or
not by x only after the measurement (hence, in general, in a state that is
different from S). Thus, conjoint knowledge of pairs of arbitrary properties
can be obtained in some cases in the SR model. For example, whenever one
can predict that x possesses a property F1 at time t and a measurement of
another property F2 on x at t yields outcome 1, then one knows that both
F1 and F2 are possessed by x at t, whatever F1 and F2 may be.
Secondly, note that the conjoint knowledge mentioned above does not
survive, in general, after t, since the interaction between x and the measur-
ing apparatus may change the state of x (this issue will be discussed in more
details in Sec. 6, referring to the special case of ideal measurements). What-
ever it may be, however, such a change does not imply that the properties
of x must be different after the measurement: it only implies a modification
of our knowledge about the properties that are certainly possessed or not
possessed by x. In different words, a measurement changes our information
about x, but does not change necessarily the properties of x (though a change
of properties may occur because of the interaction with the measuring appa-
ratus). Again, this perspective is different from the perspective of standard
quantum measurement theory, in which a change of state implies a change
of the properties that are actual for x. We briefly call epistemic conception
of states in the following the new viewpoint introduced by the SR model.
6. THE PROJECTION POSTULATE
Our discussion of measurements within the SR model in Sec. 5 is carried
out by considering the microscopic physical system and the macroscopic
measuring apparatus as distinct physical entities, according to a standard
elementary way of dealing with measurement processes. It is well known,
however, that some crucial problems occur in standard QM whenever one
tries to select the subclass of apparatuses performing ideal (repeatable) mea-
surements and treat them as macroscopic quantum systems, in order to pro-
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vide a more complete description of the measurement process by considering
the compound system formed by the microscopic system plus the measuring
apparatus within standard QM. Indeed, two major difficulties occur.
(i) The unitary evolution of the whole system predicted by the Schro¨dinger
equation implies that a pure initial state evolves into a pure final state, which
may be entangled in such a way that neither the microscopic system nor the
macroscopic apparatus possess individual properties.8
(ii) The experimental situation at the end of a measurement is described
in standard QM by the projection postulate, which can be justified whenever
the component subsystems are considered separately.9 Yet, the projection
postulate leads to predict a stochastic evolution according to which the fi-
nal state of the whole system is a mixture rather than a pure state (to be
precise, the mixture corresponding to the final state in (i) via biorthogonal
decomposition8). This prediction implies that the component subsystems
possess individual properties, which is consistent with observative data (one
can indeed observe properties of the measuring apparatus directly). But it is
then unclear how the stochastic evolution can be reconciled with the unitary
evolution that should occur according to the Schro¨dinger equation, and, in
particular, with nonobjectivity.
The attempts to solve the above problems have produced a huge and
generally known literature, that we do not list here for the sake of brevity.
Rather, we would like to provide in this section a first, qualitative treatment
of these problems from the viewpoint of the SR model.
First of all, we note that we have not yet introduced any assumption
8We remind that, in order to know whether this occurs, one can consider the biorthog-
onal decomposition of the vector | χ〉 representing the final state S, according to which
| χ〉 = ∑
i∈I
√
pi | ϕi〉 | ψi〉, with I a set of indexes, pi > 0,
∑
i∈I pi = 1, | ϕi〉 and
| ψi〉 vectors representing states of the microscopic object and macroscopic apparatus,
respectively. Whenever {| ϕi〉}i∈I and {| ψi〉}i∈I are bases in the Hilbert spaces of the
two component subsystems, it is easy to verify (by considering any projection operator
representing a physical property of one of the two subsystems) that neither of these may
possess individual properties. By the way, we also remind that the biorthogonal decom-
position allows one to associate a state MS , which is represented by the density operator
ρ =
∑
i∈I pi | ϕi〉 | ψi〉〈 ϕi | 〈ψi |, with the pure state S. Of course, MS is a mixture (and
differs from S) if I contains more than an element.
9By using the symbols in footnote 8, we remind that this justification can be attained
by representing the final state S by means of the projection operator PS =| χ〉〈χ | rather
than by means of the vector | χ〉, and then performing a partial trace of PS with respect
to the subsystem that one does not want to consider.
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about time evolution in the SR model. However, consistency with standard
QM suggests one to maintain that also in this model the vector representing
a pure state of the whole system undergoes unitary evolution. Furthermore,
one is also led to maintain that, whenever ideal measurements are performed
and the a0 outcome does not occur, the projection postulate provides a good
description of probabilities and final states of the system.
Let us come now to difficulties (i) and (ii) above. It is apparent that
the assumption of unitary evolution, though identical to the standard QM
assumption, does not raise any problem within the SR model when applied to
the measurement process. Indeed, objectivity implies that every conceivable
property of microscopic system or measuring apparatus either is possessed or
not by the subsystem that is considered, even if one cannot generally know a
priori which of the two alternatives occurs (it follows, in particular, that no
special argument, or additional assumption, or modification of time evolution
is needed in order to explain macroscopic objectivity). This implies that
difficulty (i) disappears. Furthermore, also the contradiction in (ii) between
unitary and stochastic evolution is far less relevant because of objectivity,
since all properties of the component subsystems are actual according to
both descriptions within the SR model. Hence, one can safely resort to the
old idea of reconciling the two descriptions by assuming that one of them is
theoretically rigorous, the other one is approximate. In order to implement
this idea, let us provide a possible scheme of description of the measuring
process within the SR model, matching the standard simplified description
of this process that is used in many books in order to show in an elementary
way that unitary evolution does not fit in with the evolution predicted via
projection postulate (see, e.g., Ref. 25).
For the sake of simplicity, let us consider a discrete, nondegenerate ob-
servable A0 with eigenvalues a0, a1, a2, ... and let | ψ0〉, | ψ1〉, | ψ2〉, ... be
the vectors representing the statuses of a macroscopic apparatus measuring
A0 that correspond to a0, a1, a2, ... respectively. Furthermore, let | ϕ1〉,
| ϕ2〉, ... be vectors in the Hilbert space of the microscopic system x such
that, if x is in the state described by | ϕi〉, either it is not detected (outcome
a0) or the outcome ai is obtained. Whenever the initial state of the whole
system before the measurement is represented by the product vector | χ(i)i 〉
= | ϕi〉 | ψ0〉, the final state at the end of the measurement is represented by
the vector
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| χ(f)i 〉 = ti | ϕi〉 | ψi〉+ t
′
i | ϕ
′
i〉 | ψ0〉, (1)
where | ti |2 and | t′i |2= 1− | ti |2 are the probabilities of the ai and
the a0 outcomes, respectively, and | ϕ′i〉 is an unknown final state of the
microscopic system. If one assumes that the whole system undergoes unitary
evolution and that its initial state is represented by the product vector | χ(i)〉
= (
∑
i ci | ϕi〉) | ψ0〉, the final state is represented by the vector
| χ(f)〉 =
∑
i
citi | ϕi〉 | ψi〉+
∑
i
cit
′
i | ϕ
′
i〉 | ψ0〉. (2)
If one requires consistency with the standard picture, the state Sf represented
(up to a normalization constant) by the vector
∑
i citi | ϕi〉 | ψi〉 should coin-
cide with the state predicted by standard QM. The above description shows
that Sf is generally different from the final state of all samples at the end
of the measurement, and refers to the samples of the whole system in which
the a0 outcome does not occur, that are selected by the observer through
direct inspection of the apparatus (which does not introduce contradictions
because of the epistemic conception of states pointed out in Sec. 5; note
that the selection performed by the observer plays the role of a second mea-
surement on the whole system, without implying, however, any problematic
objectification induced by the conscience of the observer himself).
Let us remind now that standard QM shows that one cannot distinguish
an entangled state from the mixture corresponding to it (via biorthogonal
decomposition8) by simply considering probabilities of properties of the com-
ponent subsystems separately.(26) But if one considers in standard QM the
entangled state Sf produced by unitary evolution at the end of a measure-
ment, one may maintain that Sf can be distinguished from the corresponding
mixture MSf predicted via projection postulate by means of repeated mea-
surements of the support FSf of Sf on set of samples of the whole system
consisting of the microscopic system plus the macroscopic measuring appara-
tus (see end of Sec. 2). This is however impossible in practice. Alternatively,
one could measure a number of correlation properties by making measure-
ments of first order properties on the two subsystems separately (see again
Sec. 2; it may also occur that different correlation properties require measur-
ing different noncommeasurable observables on the macroscopic apparatus).
But also this procedure is practically impossible. Hence, it is reasonable to
maintain within the SR model that the description of the samples in which
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the a0 outcome does not occur by means of MSf is an approximation, which
is equivalent FAPP (for all practical purposes) to the description provided
by Sf . Thus, because of objectivity, stochastic evolution can be seen as an
approximate law, valid for a special class of measuring devices (performing
ideal measurements) and in accessible physical situations, which avoids the
complications of a complete quantum description of the measurement process
and is hardly distinguishable from the correct theoretical law.
The problems raised by the projection postulate are thus greatly un-
dramatized in our perspective. Moreover, this postulate provides a correct
description of the microscopic system after a measurement in standard QM
(see (ii) above), hence also within the SR model if one considers only physi-
cal objects that are actually detected. We therefore close this section pointing
out some consequences of it in the framework of the SR model and show-
ing that these consequences are consistent with the general remarks on the
measurement process made in Sec. 5.
To begin with, let us observe that one can introduce a physically mean-
ingful relation of consistency on the set of all pure states of a physical system
in the SR model by saying that the pure states S1 and S2 are consistent iff the
vectors | ϕ1〉 and | ϕ2〉 that represent them, respectively, are not orthogonal.
Indeed, if S1 and S2 are consistent, there is no property that is certainly pos-
sessed by a physical object x if x is in the state S1 and certainly not possessed
if x is in the state S2. On the contrary, such a property exists if S1 and S2
are not consistent. Thus, S1 and S2 are consistent iff x can possess the same
properties in the state S1 and in the state S2 (of course, we cannot know
whether this actually occurs, since the knowledge of the state of a physical
object provides only incomplete information about its properties, see Sec. 5).
Then, the description of measurements provided by the projection pos-
tulate has the following features in the SR model (see also Ref. 3).
(i) The final pure state Sj of a physical object x after a measurement
of an observable A0 that yields the (possibly degenerate) eigenvalue aj is
consistent with the pure state S of x before the measurement. Indeed, S
and Sj are represented by non-orthogonal vectors. This implies that x may
possess the same properties before and after the measurement. Hence, the
measurement produces a change of our information about x, but it does not
necessarily imply a change of the properties of x (though a change of the set
of properties possessed by x may actually occur because of the interaction
of the physical object with the measuring apparatus). We thus get, by using
the projection postulate, the same result that we have obtained by means of
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general arguments in Sec. 5 (which introduces, as we have already observed, a
viewpoint that is deeply different from the viewpoint adopted by the standard
quantum measurement theory).
Note that if Sj and Sk are the pure states predicted by the projection
postulate after distinct measurements on a physical object x in the state S
that yield the eigenvalues aj and ak of the observable A0, respectively, Sj and
Sk are not consistent, since the vectors representing them are orthogonal.
This matches with the fact that the properties FSj = “having value aj of
A0” and FSK = “having value ak of A0”, that are the supports of Sj and Sk,
respectively, are mutually exclusive.
(ii) Let Sa and Sb be the pure states predicted by the projection postulate
after (ideal) measurements on a physical object x in the state S that yield
the eigenvalues a and b of the observables A0 and B0, respectively. Then,
Sa and Sb can be consistent even when the properties Fa = “having value
a of A0” and Fb = “having value b of B0”, that are the supports of Sa and
Sb, respectively, are noncommeasurable. This occurs whenever the vectors
| ϕa〉 and | ϕb〉 that represent Sa and Sb, respectively, are not orthogonal, and
intuitively means that x may possess both properties Fa and Fb conjointly,
even if one cannot generally know whether this occurs by means of a conjoint
measurement of them (yet, one can attain this knowledge in some cases by
means of a prediction followed by a measurement, as we have seen in Sec.
5). Again, this feature distinguishes the viewpoint provided by the SR model
from the standard interpretation, according to which Fa and Fb can never be
simultaneously real for the physical object x.
7. AN INTUITIVE PICTURE FOR THE SR MODEL
Our treatment of the locality and measurement problems in the previous sec-
tions has been carried out by referring to the SR model in which macroscopic
properties only are considered, so that strict operational requirements are ful-
filled (though the SR model does not adopt a verificationist attitude, see Ref.
1). Therefore, our perspective does not provide an intuitive picture of what
is going on at the microscopic level. But if one accepts introducing micro-
scopic properties of physical objects such a picture becomes possible and
it has been recently propounded by one of us as an autonomous model(27),
based on the extended SR model expounded in Ref. 1 but bringing in it
some important corrections. The new model provides a sample of objective
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interpretation of QM, and all relevant features of the SR model hold in it (in
particular, MGP), so that it can be regarded from our present viewpoint as
a set-theoretical proof of the consistency of the SR model. For the sake of
completeness we therefore report the essentials of it here.
To begin with, we accept the correspondence of microscopic and macro-
scopic properties established in the framework of the extended SR model.
To be precise, we assume that every microscopic physical system is charac-
terized by a set E of microscopic physical properties (which play the role of
theoretical entities), and that every sample of the system (physical object)
either possesses or does not possess each property in E . Moreover, every mi-
croscopic property f in E corresponds to a macroscopic property F = (A0,∆),
where A0 is an observable and ∆ a Borel set on the real line such that a0 /∈ ∆,
hence is represented by the same projection operator that represents (A0,∆).
Whenever a physical object x is prepared by a given preparing device π (for
the sake of simplicity we assume here that the equivalence class of π is a pure
state S, see Ref. 1, Sec. 2) and A0 is measured by means of a suitable appa-
ratus, the set of microscopic properties possessed by x produces a probability
(which is either 0 or 1 if the model is deterministic) that the apparatus does
not react, so that the outcome a0 may be obtained. In this case, a nonacces-
sible physical situation occurs, and we cannot get any explicit information
about the microscopic physical properties possessed by x. In particular, we
cannot assert that they are related as the projection operators representing
them are related by the laws of standard QM, which is consistent with MGP.
If, on the contrary, the apparatus reacts, an outcome different from a0, say a,
is obtained, and we are informed that x possesses all microscopic properties
associated with macroscopic properties of the form F = (A0,∆), where ∆ is
a Borel set such that a0 /∈ ∆ and a ∈ ∆ (for the sake of brevity, we also say
that x possesses all macroscopic properties as F in this case). Then, when-
ever a law of standard QM is considered, both accessible and nonaccessible
physical situations may occur, and only in the former situations we can assert
that the microscopic properties of x are related as the projection operators
representing them in the given law.
Let us come now to our intuitive picture. Whenever the preparing device
π is activated repeatedly, a (finite) set S of physical objects in the state S is
prepared. Let us partition S into subsets S(1), S(2), ..., S(n), such that in each
subset all objects possess the same microscopic properties, and assume that
a measurement of an observable A0 is done on every object. Furthermore,
let us introduce the following symbols.
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N: number of physical objects in S.
N0: number of physical objects in S that are not detected.
N(i): number of physical objects in S(i).
N
(i)
0 : number of physical objects in S(i) that are not detected.
N
(i)
F : number of physical objects in S(i) that possess the macroscopic
property F = (A0,∆) corresponding to the microscopic property f.
It follows from our above interpretation that the number N
(i)
F either co-
incides with N(i)−N(i)0 or with 0. The former case occurs whenever f is
possessed by the objects in S(i), since all objects that are detected then yield
outcome in ∆. The latter case occurs whenever f is not possessed by the ob-
jects in S(i), since all objects that are detected then yield outcome different
from a0 but outside ∆. In both cases one generally gets N
(i)−N(i)0 6= 0 (even
if N(i)−N(i)0 = 0 may also occur, in particular in a deterministic model), so
that the following equation holds:
N
(i)
F
N (i)
=
N (i) −N (i)0
N (i)
N
(i)
F
N (i) −N (i)0
. (3)
The term on the left in Eq. (3) represents the frequency of objects pos-
sessing the property F in S(i), the first term on the right the frequency of
objects in S(i) that are detected, the second term (which either is 1 or 0) the
frequency of objects that possess the property F in the subset of all objects
in S(i) that are detected.
The frequency of objects in S that possess the property F is given by
1
N
∑
i
N
(i)
F =
N −N0
N
(
∑
i
N
(i)
F
N −N0 ). (4)
Let us assume now that all frequencies converge in the large number limit,
so that they can be substituted by probabilities, and that these probabilities
do not depend on the choice of the preparation π in S (which is consistent
with the definition of states in Ref. 1, Sec. 2). Hence, if one considers the
large number limit of Eq. (3), one gets
P(i)tS (F ) = P(i)d(F )P(i)S (F ), (5)
where P(i)tS (F ) is interpreted as the overall probability that a physical object
x possessing the microscopic properties that characterize S(i) also possess the
property F, P(i)dS (F ) as the probability that x be detected when F is measured
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on it, P(i)S (F ) (which either is 0 or 1) as the probability that x possess the
property F when detected. Moreover, if one considers the large number limit
of Eq. (4) and reminds the interpretation of quantum probabilities in Sec. 4,
(1), it is reasonable to assume that the second term on the right converges to
the standard quantum probability PS(F ) that a physical object in the state
S possess the property F, so that one gets
P tS(F ) = Pd(F )PS(F ), (6)
where P tS(F ) is interpreted as the overall probability that a physical object
x in a state S possess the property F and PdS(F ) as the probability that
x be detected when F is measured on it. Thus, one can maintain that a
broader theory embodying QM can be conceived, according to which the
standard quantum probability PS(F ) is considered as a conditional rather
than an absolute probability. Of course, Eq. (6) is also compatible with a
model in which Pd(F ) is interpreted as the efficiency of a non-ideal measuring
apparatus. Yet, our picture predicts that Pd(F ) may be less than 1 also in the
case of an ideal apparatus. Indeed, every π in S prepares objects which do not
possess the same microscopic properties, and some objects may possess sets
of properties that make the detection of them by any apparatus measuring
F possible but not certain, or even impossible.
To close up, let us note that the intuitive picture provided above in-
troduces a substantial correction in the extended SR model that inspires it,
since it substitutes Eq. (5) to the equation PA0S(F ) = PA0(F,G,H, ...)PS(F )
that appears in this model. Bearing in mind its definition, the probability
PA0S(F ) can be obtained as the large number limit of the term on the left
in Eq. (3) (which shows that the suffix S in it is rather misleading). Analo-
gously, the probability PA0(F,G,H, ...) can be obtained as the large number
limit of the first term on the right in the same equation. However, the second
term on the right in Eq. (3) does not converge to the quantum probability
PS(F ), hence the above equation of the extended SR model is not correct in
our new picture. We observe, however, that also in this picture the fair sam-
pling assumption does not hold, which is important for theoretical reasons
(see Ref. 1, Sec. 5).
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